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In this brief comment, the public choice theory
1
 aims to distinguish the dilemmas and conflicts 
in formal and empirical. The hypothesis argues that the reality more complex than the principles 
of choice of Pareto and Liberalism*. Both the ethics and politics are taking decisions that are 
not always in line with the requirements of rationality and complete information.  
 





Externalities need collective decisions to protect the identity of agents and their 
differences. It is a prerequisite, not only in the markets, but in open and democratic 
societies
2
. However, these externalities are not met. Observe a public tender for 
contracts with the State in emerging countries, are transparent processes information 
and incentives for those who aspire to earn? It is not clear. Just as in the contracting 
state, a majority of collective choice processes fail in these conditions
3
. Presidential 
elections in Colombia, such as, can be decided by a simple majority vote, but the 
constitutional reforms introduced possibilities of coalitions between the first round 
losers. So they create conditions that allow for changes in voter preferences
4
.  
In this sense, the policy also applies market allocation. In economic systems it is 
entirely impossible neutrality when making decisions that can affect everyone
5
. I like 
fruit for breakfast; you like eating bread with jam, a change in our preferences can offer 
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a different social outcome even if the social alternatives available remain the same. 
Then there can be no neutrality radical. Neutrality is not met; we are not indifferent 
toward our differences. Assuming you'd rather stay at home than going on holiday, 
being Σ the rest of the welfare state, while you have the opposite preference. The market 
model can guarantee you go on vacation. Otherwise I'd rather you stay home with his 
family (being Σ the rest of the welfare state), while you want the opposite in my case. 
These are simply a substitution of alternatives. However, the market will motivates you 
go on vacation.  
All of the above acts in the opposite of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”6. The people's 
preferences are met by comparing the state of their welfare. Neutrality is not a superior 
force (as opposed to Max Weber)  
Someone can take a Protestant conduct: do not believe in the market! Indeed, this is one 
of the shortcomings of the market mechanism, not being able to develop a 
comprehensive agenda on our "externalities." And not only in the cases mentioned, but 
in certain types of collective choice. In the midst of a march that was attacked by 
African bees, what places offer greater security? Simplified preferences cut the nature 
of human behavior.  
 
Liberal Values  
In society we have preferences that seem to depend solely on people. Σ As everything 
else in society, Mr. A prefers the single life (x) and Σ being anything else, Mr. A is 
getting married (and), while many others prefer the opposite. It can be argued that the 
social choice between x and y is a purely private matter for Mr. A is the only one 
involved, while others can only be curious. However, according to Wittgenstein, it is 




In its weakest sense, the condition of rationality states that everyone is absolutely 
critical in the social choice between at least a couple of alternatives, such as, that Mr. A 
is deciding between x and y. In general there may be one of these cases. But we must 
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multiply because (a) there are other examples of such personal decisions, such as, Mr. A 
meditates a psalm from the Bible of Jerusalem before falling asleep, but others find it 
more a story of Andersen, and (b) how to sleep there are many ways since Σ can be 
different. Mr. A has had an accident that forces him to sleep on your side facing the 
wall. So the condition of a liberal minimum (Nozick) shows sufficiently limited in terms 
of preference options people have.  
The formalists can add an even stronger condition of rationality, which we call the 
condition L*, this condition requires that at least two individuals have personal 
preferences reflected in the social preference on a pair of alternatives each. This 
condition is extremely fragile and can be called minimalist status of liberalism, as 
further reducing the number of individuals with such freedom (i.e. reducing it to an 
individual) will allow an autocracy, and its limits, a dictatorship
8
.  
The fact is that these conditions of rationality L* are finally incompatible with the 
conditions U (unrestricted domain) and P (weak Pareto principle), when placed upon an 
SDF, as shown by Sen (1970). Open social systems of preference domains and 
collective decision also expanded the range of opportunities. This impossibility result 
can be contrasted with Arrow's impossibility theorem.  
Although the condition L* (minimum liberalism) is somewhat stronger than the 
condition of Arrow D (not dictatorship), but is also weaker than what we demand an 
open society. The terms U and P are shared by Arrow's theorem. The independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is important in Arrow's theorem, but not in this case addressed. 
The inability to continue, but it is overwhelmingly in the formal framework of the 
theorems.  
An example may clarify the nature of the problem. Suppose that the social choice is 
between three alternatives: that Mr. A read a copy of The Adventures of the Good 
Soldier Švejk (Jaroslav Hasek) that Mr. B can read, or read any of them. We call these 
alternatives a, b, c, respectively. Mr A, would prefer that no one reads it, after reading 
and finally that Mr. B does not have a chance. Mr. B, he would prefer any of them read 
it to any of them do, but also prefer that Mr. A reading it, because he wants Mr. A was 
happy with the ironies of the good soldier. Then Mr. B prefers a  to b and b to c.  
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Let the liberal argument: given the choice between Mr. A to read and not read anyone 
their own preference should be reflected in the social preference. So society would 
prefer not to read anyone to read what Mr.  A who considers reading a waste of time. It 
follows that c is socially preferable to a. Similarly, there is a liberal argument in favor of 
B show the preferences of the social choice between that Mr. B will read it and anyone 
else to do. Thus b is preferred to c. Hence, society should prefer that Mr. B you to do it 
no one did so and the latter to Mr. A to read it. However, that Mr. B to read as Pareto is 
worse than read Mr. A, even in terms of weak Pareto criterion, and if the social 
preference respects degradation, then, is preferable to b. In short, each alternative can be 
considered worse than any other.  
The road taken reflects true preferences of social dilemmas. This is not only the limited 
capacity of choice but also the inability to make an optimal choice. In a dark street a 
thief assaults his victim: "money or your life." The conditions did not give to 
speculation. And trading in such situations is impossible. However, in this case is a real 
dilemma in extreme? Normal life often presents illustrations of lesser risk.  
 
Limitations liberal   
This critique of liberalism L* passed as a critique of solipsism
9
. The assumption that 
certain things-like states of knowledge-are matters "private and personal" is not 
sustainable. The music that puts Mr. A does not let you sleep Mr. B, then, is a matter 
also of Mr. B. If Mr. B can not pass wonders with music that places Mr. A, it means that 
whatever Mr. A is important for what Mr. B. This interdependence is relevant, and has 
also been strategically assessed the threat of nuclear war
10
.  
The context that creates such conditions is related to the concepts developed by 
Wittgenstein on the meaning of "rule-following”11. In the same way we learn a 
language, a rule allows us to understand the meaning of certain proscriptions: child 
pornography, pedophilia, or handling of marijuana. All these aspects make up rules for 
limiting some people over others. Politics as a device intended to regulate power 
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imbalances
12
. In this respect, liberalism L* shown limited due to the conditions found in 
open societies. In its formalized version, the condition L* implies a couple of 
alternatives and only a couple of people. Moreover, with the possibility of a world with 
such features, the choices would have to be neutral and uniform.  
Here's another objection. In an open society manifests respect for personal privacy 
conditions. However, according to the L*, personal decisions can be enforced. If I am 
offered to choose between affirming the absolute truth (x) or die (y), under such 
conditions of freedom is a chimera. This means that the minimum versions of liberalism 
are difficult, both from a formal point of view and from the perspective of its 
applications to open societies.  
The problem of failure in collective choice much affects personal choice. We can not 
guarantee individual liberties, although they may be ideal mechanisms of collective 
choice. This guarantee depends primarily on the development of values and preferences 
that mutual respect privacy and personal choices. The liberal values of type L * respond 
to a remote version of classical liberalism, in John Stuart Mill as David Hume, for 
example, the term liberal is used to refer to a person who is deeply interested in 
protecting personal freedom from interference of others.  
 
Conclusions  
Conflicts arising from the collective choice can limit the Pareto principle. Moreover, 
this principle is inapplicable in liberalism least unless we assume that individual 
preferences are reduced to certain specific patterns. But the Pareto principle P is adapted 
to the justifications of liberalism L*.  
In the analytical expression of liberalism such Nozick, for example, freedom of choice 
is motivated by the P status of the person A, you can take interest in the affairs 
"personal" B, as a justification to consider it also a matter of A. Advocates of this 
position in the public choice also defend possessive individualism. 
The importance of formal analysis is that it helps to look at issues not clear in the 
experience. However, formal systems are often not responding to the complexities of 
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collective choice. Decisions on political or economic, are always loaded with personal 
bias. And a majority of situations present us with decisions that we can qualify, then (ex 
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